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I. INTRODUCTION

America tends to notice only its most glaring deficiencies. Even so,
the call for reform only grows louder when such deficiencies personally
affect the privileged masses. From the plummeting value of the
American dollar to the skyrocketing prices at the pump, the hornbook
for American current events is largely comprised of what is impossible
to ignore. There is, however, an equally disturbing trend lurking beneath
the shadows and despite repeated pleas from the small business
community, the federal government has refused to acknowledge and
legitimize the increasing role of financial intermediaries in the capitalraising process.'
While innovation comes in all shapes and sizes, the need for start-up
capital is common to most, if not all, of America's inventors and
entrepreneurs. 2 Small businesses could historically rely on venture
capitalists and mid-sized brokers for funding, but these sources of startup capital have recently begun to run dry. 3 As a result, many small
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Richmond: T.C. Williams School of Law; B.S.E., 2005, Baylor
University.
1. See Ronald Fink, FindersKeepers: The SEC Is HearingNew Demands To Make It Easierfor Small
Companies To Raise Capital, CFO MAGAZrNE, Feb. 1, 2005, at 1, available at httip://www.cfo.
com/article.cfim/3598448/c 3666324?f=singlepage; see also Robert Connolly, Comment, Legitimizing
Private Placement Broker-Dealers Who Deal with Private Investment Funds: A Proposalfor a New
Regulatory Regime and a Limited Exception to Registration,40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 703, 704 (2007).
2. See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A ProposalTo Expand
the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 864
(2005).
3. See A.B.A. Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the
Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers,60 BUS. LAW. 959, 968-69 (2005) [hereinafter
A.B.A. Report].
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businesses are forced to engage financial intermediaries, or finders, to
seek out nontraditional sources of funding. 4 Many wonder, however, if
finders are worth the risk.5 Unlike professional broker-dealers, who are
required to register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), 6 finders are a largely unregulated industry.7 When a finder
steps beyond the mere connection of buyers and sellers and becomes too
involved in the securities transaction, he operates as an unregistered
broker-dealer and exposes the transaction's participants to stiff SEC
penalties.8 Despite this "Catch-22" confronting small business owners,
the SEC has failed to draw a clear line between lawful finding and
unlawful broker-dealing. 9 This uncertainty in the federal arena has
prompted some states to enact their own finder's legislation, 10 and
rather than alleviating the tension, these state regulations present fresh
problems of conflicting state and federal regimes.
This comment argues that the current treatment of financial
intermediaries in the capital-raising process is unresponsive to the
changing landscape of the small business community. Not only does the
SEC inadequately define the permissible role of a finder, recent
legislation in Texas and South Dakota foreshadows the ills of a dual
regulatory society. Rather than waiting for states to address the finder's
dilemma on an ad hoc and inconsistent basis, the federal government
should create an SEC-registered class of finders to facilitate capital
formation and jumpstart a receding American economy.
Part II
examines the expanding role of financial intermediaries in small market
financing and the SEC's less than desirable definition of a finder exempt
from federal registration. Part III explains how Michigan, Texas, and
South Dakota have addressed the finder's dilemma, and why their

4. See Connolly, supra note 1, at 729.
5. Cf Virginia K. Kapner, When FindersBring Trouble: Avoiding Pifalls of Working with Unlicensed
Broker-Dealers,BOSTON B.J., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 14 (discussing the legal "pitfalls" and risks of using
finders); Victor L. Zimmerman, Jr., To Register or Not: A Finder'sBig Dilemma: Those Who Assist
Emerging Companies in Getting Investors Could Be Subject to Certain Federal and State Securities
Laws, THE NAT'L L.J., Jan. 22, 2001, at B9 (encouraging activity monitoring).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2006).
7. See Nelson S. Ebaugh, New FinderRules in Texas: What a Tangled Web We Weave, THE HOUSTON
LAW., July-Aug. 2007, at 20, available at http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aajuly07/page20.htm.
8. See Kapner, supranote 5.
9. See Brad R. Jacobsen & Olympia Z. Fay, Finding a Solution to the Problem with Findersin Utah,
19 UTAH B.J. 38, 42, Apr. 24, 2006, available at http://www.utahbar.org/barjoumal/archives/2006/04/
finding a solut.hlml; Orcutt, supranote 2, at 903.
10. See Christine Hall, New Rule Clarifies When 'Finders' Can Be Keepers, HOUSTON BUS. J., Feb. 2,
2007, available at http://houston.bizjoumals.com/houston/stories/2007/02/05/focusl .html.
11. Cf Ebaugh, supra note 7, at 20 (explaining that a finder may comply with Texas securities law
while violating federal securities law).
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answers represent the problematic birth of a dual regulatory system.
Part IV chronicles the thwarted development of past reform efforts and
concludes by outlining the emerging consensus behind a federallyregistered class of finders.
II.

THE RISE OF THE FINDER AND THE NEED FOR CLARITY

The SEC was designed to ensure the integrity of the securities market
by safeguarding investors and encouraging capital formation. 12 By
ignoring the capital-raising problems of small start-up businesses,
however, the SEC's regulatory scheme inhibits small business formation
and effectively stymies the growth of the American economy. 3 The
capital market demands the use of financial intermediaries, but under
current law, small business owners are left guessing as to whether their
involvement with an overactive finder will result in sanctions for
employing an unregistered broker-dealer.1 4 This section explains why
finders are essential to future economic growth and how the SEC's
failure to define finders exposes small business owners to severe and
unnecessary risks.
A. The Small Business Funding Gap and the Increased Demand for Finder
Services
The pockets of most entrepreneurs are not deep enough to provide all
the funding necessary to turn their ideas into reality. 5 Instead, smaller
start-ups must typically secure outside equity financing to fund their
ventures.1 6 Traditionally, this funding was readily provided by venture
capitalists and mid-sized issuers, but in recent years, the pool of available
start-up capital has evaporated.
Venture capitalists have focused their
12. See SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2008)
[hereinafter SEC, Investor's Advocate].
13. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 960 ("Small business capital formation is key to creating jobs
in America. Small businesses create many more new jobs than large public companies who have no
need for [financial intermediaries]."); Orcutt, supra note 2, at 861 ("The continuous creation of new
rapid-growth start-ups plays a substantial role in the success of the U.S. economy."). See generally
Ash Demirgfii-Kunt & Ross Levine, Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long-Run Growth,
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4469, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com
/sol3/papers.cfmh?abstract id=1081783#PaperDownload (discussing the relationship between finance
policy and economic growth).
14. See Jacobson & Fay, supranote 9, at 38-39; Zimmerman, supranote 5.
15. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 869.
16. See id.
17. See A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 968-69.
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efforts on larger ventures in later stages, and mid-sized brokerage firms
have either disappeared or have been subsumed by bigger firms with
grander schemes.1 8 The result is a small business market gap where startups seeking $250 thousand to $5 million are denied access to traditional
markets and are funneled into nontraditional streams of income. 19
Financial intermediaries thus become an essential conduit by which
entrepreneurs can connect to potential investors. 20 This compelled
interaction between desperate start-ups and nontraditional investors has
21
created a semi-underground market of unregulated finder activity.
Though the finder's market ultimately puts start-up capital into the
hands of small business owners, an unregistered finder can easily cross
the line into unlawful broker-dealership if he becomes too involved in
the securities transaction. 22
The Securities and Exchange Act
("Exchange Act") prohibits unregistered persons from effecting any

18. See id. Venture capitalists and other brokers have replaced smaller deals with larger deals for a
number of reasons. Id. at 968. Mainly, though, larger deals reap significantly larger rewards while
bearing elements of time, risk, and transaction costs that are comparable to smaller deals. See id. at
968-69; see also Fink, supra note 1 (describing how "federally registered broker-dealers that might
once have provided capital have either gone under or merged into larger investment banks that don't
consider start-ups worth their time").
19. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 874; see also Lee R. Petillon & Mark T. Hiraide, CA: Private Offerings
Using Non-Registered Broker-Dealers,ACTIVE CAPITAL, 2005, available at http://activecapital.org/
story?storyid=20094 (explaining that companies seeking less than $5 million in start-up capital "find it
difficult to attract investment bankers who are registered broker/dealers, as such small offerings are
not economic for the broker/dealer"). In their seed stages, entrepreneurial groups can typically raise
$250,000 themselves. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 874-75. Larger entities further along in their
development, on the other hand, can typically secure $5 million or more from more-than-eager
venture capitalists. Id. Many of the larger brokerage firms are not even willing to fund $5 million
deals, setting their floor at $25 million. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 968; Connolly, supra note
1, at 704.
20. See Connolly, supra note 1, at 704; see also Sherman A. Cohen, et. al., Finders, Broker-Dealers,
and
the
Gray
Area
in
Between,
available
at
http://www.agg.com/Contents/PublicationDetail.aspx?ID=910 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) ("If history is
any guide, many companies will use 'finders'-a match-maker of sorts for the cash needy and the
financially flush."). Another beneficiary of the capital funding squeeze is the angel investor market,
which is comprised of wealthy, accredited investors providing start-up capital to fledgling businesses.
See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 874-75; Zimmerman, supra note 5. As of the turn of the decade, angels
were funding between thirty and forty times as many start-ups as venture capitalists. Zimmerman,
supranote 5 (citing MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING 69 (2000)).
21. The American Bar Association has referred to the unregulated finder's market as a "vast and
pervasive 'gray market' of brokerage activity" typified by uncertainty and risky behavior. See
A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 959; see also Hugh Makens, Capital Formation: Making Finders
Viable, Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation, Sept. 20, 2004, at 4,
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/hmakens.pdf ("Problems relating to unregistered finders
have been particularly prominent in the raising of early stage capital for smaller business. I believe
that there is a vast 'gray market' of unregistered brokerage activity where the funding for these
companies, who generally can't access traditional brokerage firms for underwritings, is often obtained
through unregistered financial intermediaries.").
22. See Kapner, supranote 5.
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transactions in securities, 23 and violations invite swift and severe
2
penalties. 24 Finders are potentially subject to monetary damages, civil
injunctions enjoining future participation in securities activities, 26 and
criminal prosecution, if the violation was willful. 27 A similar strategy
can be employed against issuers, 28 and investors often retain the right to
rescind their securities purchase. 29 On top of the heightened risk of
statutory penalties, the finder's market also exposes its participants to a
higher rate of fraud than traditional capital markets.3 0 Unlike brokerdealers, who are registered and monitored by the SEC, finders are a
largely unregulated community with their fair share of unsavory and
unsophisticated individuals.31 Despite the endemic risks of employing
unregistered third parties to secure capital, the venture may not survive
without a financial intermediary, and because of this, finders have
32
become a necessary evil in the small business community.
B. The SEC's Failure To Define the Lawful Activities of a Finder
Given the seriousness of employing an unregistered broker-dealer, an
ideal regulatory environment would clearly define the permissible role of
a finder in the capital-raising process. 33 Unfortunately, the SEC's
characterization of a lawful finder is blurry at best, and small businesses
are forced to determine whether their use of a finder is illegal on a caseby-case basis. 34 Best practices define a finder as a person who connects
buyers and sellers of securities for a flat fee and then disappears from the

23. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2006).
24. See Jacobsen & Fay, supranote 9, at 39-40.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b) (2006).
26. Id. § 78u(d).
27. Id. § 78ff(a).
28. Orcutt, supranote 2, at 925.
29. Id. at 925-26; see also Kapner, supranote 5.
30. See Fink, supra note 1 (explaining that because finders are exempt from the burdens of federal
registration, the current finder's market leaves "more of the field to those inclined toward fraud").
31. See id.; see also Hall, supra note 10 (stating that the presence of "bad people" prompted Texas to
enact its finders legislation). But see A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 961 (comparing finders to social
drinkers during prohibition who are otherwise "ethical and honest individuals"). Despite the actual
composition of the money-finding community, the point remains that its members do not fall within the
SEC's regulatory authority until they visibly err. Such an unregulated community undeniably
engenders a vast potential for fraudulent activity. See Fink, supranote 1; see also Hall, supranote 10.
32. See Jacobsen & Fay, supra note 9, at 42 ("Small businesses and start-up companies in need of
investment capital are often in a 'Catch-22' when it comes to raising funds. Without additional capital,
such companies may not survive, but if they raise capital through the use of a finder, they will likely be
violating the law which, in turn, may lead to their demise.").
33. See A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 959-60.
34. See id.
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transaction. 35 Because the uncertainty surrounding the distinction
between finders and broker-dealers remains a driving force behind the
call for reform, 36 a detailed examination of the SEC's elusive finder
inquiry is warranted.
The logical starting point in the broker-dealer versus finder
distinction is the controlling statute. The Exchange Act defines brokerdealers as persons "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities, '37 and while finders are not explicitly referenced, they enjoy a
de facto exception to the broker-dealer registration requirement. 38 The
SEC also maintains an online compliance guide that lists several
intermediary activities invoking broker-dealership. 39
The concept
behind the Exchange Act and the compliance guide is simple: a legal
finder becomes an unlawful broker-dealer when he becomes too active in
facilitating securities transactions. 40 The SEC has consistently declined
to draw a mathematical bright line between permissible and
impermissible finder activities, 41 and as a result, sellers, investors, and

their counsel have been forced to test the waters by soliciting no-action
letters from the SEC staff.42 While these letters are intended to clarify
35. Id. at 966 (quoting ALAN J. BERKELEY & ALISSA J. ALTONGY, REGULATION D OFFERINGS AND
PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 51 (2001)).
36. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 974 ("[T]he present system really does not work well for
regulating many financial intermediaries. Often intermediaries play a very limited role in transactions,
but in order to engage in securities transactions, broker-dealer registration is required in a manner that
may be more appropriate to a full-service firm.").
37. Brokers and dealers are separately defined by the Exchange Act. Compare 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(4)(a) (2006) (defining brokers as "any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others"), with id. § 78c(a)(5)(a), defining dealers as "any
person who is engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for such person's own account
through a broker or otherwise"). The term broker-dealer has been commonly applied to all persons
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities. See David A. Lipton, A Primer on
Broker-DealerRegistration, 36. CATH. U. L,REV. 899, 909-10 (1987).
38. Finders are arguably engaged in the business of effecting securities transactions for both buyers
and sellers, albeit in a limited fashion. See Connolly, supra note 1, at 723; Lipton, supra note 37, at
927. Despite seemingly falling within the purview of the Exchange Act's registration requirements,
securities law has carved out an authoritative de facto finder's exception. See Lipton, supra note 37,
at 927.
39. SEC, Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketregbdguide.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter SEC, Guide]. Notably, the compliance guide advises financial
intermediaries that they may need to register as a broker-dealer if they find investors for, make
referrals to, or split commissions with registered broker-dealers, venture capital or "angel" financing,
private placement, or other securities intermediaries. Id.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A), 78c(a)(5)(A); SEC, Guide, supranote 39.
41. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 903-04.
42. See id. John Polanin, Jr. defines a no-action letter as "a response from the staff of the Commission
to an inquiry requesting assurances in connection with a proposed transaction implicating the federal
securities laws. Based on the facts and representations set forth in the inquiry, the staff states that it
will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if the parties making the request proceed
as they describe, without complying with specific statutory or regulatory provisions of those laws."
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the law, they are limited to the facts and parties specified, and they do
not constitute binding authority. 43 Nevertheless, the SEC staff has
identified the following badges of broker-dealer activity:
(1) receipt of transaction-based compensation;
(2) extensive involvement in the securities transaction, including:
(a) valuations of the prospective transaction;
(b) involvement in negotiations; and
(c) assistance with the structure of the transaction;
(3) active solicitation of securities investors; and
(4) prior involvement in securities transactions and/or prior discipline for
44
securities activities.

As explained below, the presence of any one of these factors may be
enough to require broker-dealer registration. Taken as a whole, the
staff's systematic restriction of a finder's permissible activities is
particularly troublesome considering the rising demand for finder
45
services.
1. Transaction-Based Compensation
Transaction or success-based compensation is probably the best
indicator of a broker-dealer. 46 When an intermediary's commission is
based on the ultimate success of the transaction-as opposed to a flat
referral fee-the intermediary acquires a financial stake in the
transaction and the risk of abuse is heightened. 47 For example, in the
Herbruck, Alders & Co. no-action letter, the SEC staff noted that
transaction-based compensation was "a key factor that may require an
entity to register as a broker-dealer," and "[a]bsent an exemption, an
entity that receives securities commissions. . . is [generally] required to

John Polanin, Jr., The "Finder's"Exception from FederalBroker-DealerRegistration,40 CATH. U. L.
REv. 787, 789 n.15 (1991).
43. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 904 ("Because no-action letters are purely matters between the SEC
staff and the party making the request, and because they are limited to the specific facts of the
requesting letter, it is risky for other parties to draw general conclusions from these letters."); see also
Lipton, supra note 37, at 985 (arguing that "[t]he practice of relying heavily upon no-action letters to
provide advice to potential brokers must be revisited").
44. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 904-05; A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 975; 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities
§ 328 (2008). In addition to these general factors, it is essential to remember the basic goal of investor
protection: the prevention of abusive sales practices. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 928-29. All of these
factors expose the consumer to a greater risk of fraud or deception, and as a result, the SEC staff is
more likely to require broker-dealer registration. See id.
45. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 928-29.
46. See A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 975-76.
47. See id at 977.
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register as a broker-dealer. '48 Although transaction-based compensation
raises a strong presumption of broker-dealership, finders may be able to
escape registration if they are a one-time finder who will be wholly
removed from all other aspects of the transaction. 49 Many finders
attempting to avoid registration with a success-based compensation
scheme rely on the PaulAnka no-action letter. 50 In the Anka situation,
Anka was retained by the Ottawa Senators Hockey Club to find potential
purchasers for limited partnership units. 51 He would provide the
Senators with names and telephone numbers, but would not contact the
investors with any recommendations. 52 Even though he would receive
ten percent of any sale, the SEC staff did not require Anka to register as
a broker-dealer because he played a minor role and his finder's activities
53
were limited to this one transaction.
Paul Anka represents the outer limits of permissible activity and
cannot be relied on with any degree of assurance.5 4 First, the favorable
SEC ruling was limited to Paul Anka's specific facts and those facts
alone. 55 Second, recent SEC no-action letters have called Paul Anka's
principles into question. 56 Most notably, the staff revoked its 1985
Dominion Resources letter, which granted no-action relief in spite of
Dominion's transaction-based compensation. 57 This revocation has led
some commentators to believe that the staff may be "moving to a
position where the existence of transaction-based compensation alone
58
may be sufficient to trigger broker-dealer registration.

48. Herbruck, Alder & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1290291, at *2 (June 4, 2002); see also
Mike Bantuveris, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 10654, at *4 (Oct. 23, 1975) (recommending
registration when a consulting firm would "receive fees for its services that would be proportional to
the money or property obtained by its clients and would be contingent upon such transactions in
securities").
49. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 913-14.
50. See Paul Anka, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,797,
at 78580-81 (July 24, 1991).
51. Id. at 78,580.
52. Id. at78,580-81.
53. Id. at 78,581; see also A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 976-77 (noting that the favorable letter was
likely due to Anka's "uniquely limited duties" and "the one-time occurrence of the event").
54. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also Orcutt, supra note 2, at 904 (warning
practitioners about the dangers of relying on SEC no-action letters)
55. See A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 977.
56. See id.; Orcutt, supranote 2, at 913.
57. Dominion Resources, SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 669838 (June 1, 2000) [hereinafter
Dominion 2000]; Orcutt, supranote 2, at 913.
58. A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 977; see also Orcutt, supra note 2, at 913 (arguing that the present
SEC staff might not issue a favorable letter if presented with the same fact pattern as PaulAnka).
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2. Extensive Involvement in the Securities Transaction
The more active a finder is in effecting a securities transaction, the
higher the risk of abusive trade practices, and the higher the likelihood
that the finder will be considered a broker-dealer.5 9 Because the pure
finder merely connects two parties and disappears, any investment

recommendation, negotiation participation, or transactional assistance
by a finder raises an immediate red flag. 60 As the staff pointed out in
May-Pac Management Co., "persons who play an integral role in

negotiating and effecting.

. .

transactions in securities.., are [generally]

required to register with the Commission.

' 61

To contrast activities that

require registration with activities that do not, compare the staffs
disposition in May-Pac and Victoria Bancroft. In May-Pac, registration
was required for a company that would connect buyers and sellers, help
negotiate the deal, and advise its client on the merits of any offer
received. 62 In Bancroft, registration was not required for a licensed real

estate broker who created a list of potential purchasers and introduced
them to sellers of financial institutions. 63 After Bancroft introduced the
parties, she disappeared from the deal and did not negotiate, make
64
recommendations, give advice, or assist with the financing.
Many SEC letters consider when a finder crosses the line into brokerdealership, 65 and similar to the trend in transaction-based compensation,
the SEC has consistently narrowed the scope of a finder's permissible
activities. 66
Again, much of this can be attributed to the 2000

59. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 928-29.
60. See id. at 906 (stating that "[mlaking investment recommendations or participating in negotiations
surrounding the securities transaction appear to be 'practically' dispositive factors").
61. May-Pac Mgmt. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 79,679, at 83,835 (Dec. 20, 1973).
62. See id. at 83,834-35; see also A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 978 (discussing May-Pac).
63. Victoria Bancroft, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108454, at *1 (Aug. 9, 1987).
64. Id.
65. For a sense of what activities require registration, see Capital Directions, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1979 WL 14878, at *1, *3-4 (Jan. 4, 1979); Mike Bantuveris, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL
10654, at *1, *3-4 (Oct. 23, 1975); May-Pac Mgmt. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,679, at 83,835 (Dec. 20, 1973); Fulham & Co., Inc., SEC NoAction Letter, 1972 WL 9129, at *2 (Dec. 20, 1972). To discover when a finder's activities do not
require registration, see Dana Inv. Advisors, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 718968, at *14-17
(Oct. 12, 1994); Paul Anka, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,797, at 78,580-81 (July 24, 1991); Colonial Equities, Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL
234557, at *6, *9-14 (June 28, 1988); John DiMeno, SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,940, at 81,271 (Oct. 11, 1978); Samuel Black, SEC No-Action Letter,
1977 WL 14905, at *2-3 (Jan. 20, 1977); Moana/Kauai, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8804, at *34 (Aug. 10, 1974).
66. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 907-08.
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revocation of the 1985 Dominion Resources letter. 67 In 1985, the staff
granted no-action relief even though Dominion would: (a) analyze the
financial needs of its clients; (b) recommend securities to fit its clients'
needs; (c) arrange lawyers and broker-dealers to structure the
transaction; (d) make itself available as a consultant; and (e) participate
in negotiations. 6 Relying on the staff's favorable treatment, many
finders felt confident that playing an active role in effecting a
transaction was not a per se activity of a broker-dealer. 69 The SEC gave
two reasons for revoking its 1985 letter. First, "technological advances
...

allowed more and different types of persons to become involved in

the provision of securities-related services. ' 70 The implication is with
more people using better technology, the risk of abusive sales practices
has increased. 71 Second, the staff noted that since its letter in 1985, it
72
had denied no-action requests in similar situations.
Straddling the line between a finder and a broker-dealer is a risky
proposition. 73 Even though giving advice to the client, negotiating the
deal, and structuring the transaction may not always require registration,
these activities seriously weaken a finder's case for no-action relief. A
much safer finder's practice is the connection of buyers and sellers for a
74
flat fee, and the subsequent removal of the finder from the transaction.
3. Active Solicitation of Securities Investors
A third factor implicating broker-dealership is active solicitation of
securities investors. 75 The most decisive question is whether the finder
67. See Dominion 2000, supranote 57; Orcutt, supranote 2, at 907-08.
68. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 906-07 (citing Dominion Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985
WL 54428, at *1-3, *6-7 (Aug. 24, 1985) [hereinafter Dominion 1985]).
69. See id. at 906.
70. Dominion 2000, supra note 57.
71. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 907.
72. Dominion 2000, supra note 57, at *3 (citing John R. Wirthlin, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL
34898 (Jan. 19, 1999) (requiring registration for an alleged finder who solicited investors and received
a contingency fee upon successful purchase); Davenport Mgmt., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993
WL 120436, at *11, *13 (Apr. 13, 1993) (requiring registration when a business broker receives
transaction fees for negotiations); C & W Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL
258821, at *1 (July 20, 1989) (requiring registration when a financial intermediary mediates a
negotiation and receives success-based compensation)).
73. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW

DATABASE § 23.2 (2007) (stating that "[a]ny person doing much more than simply introducing parties
to a securities transaction to each other does so at his or her peril").
74. Cf Angel Capital Elec. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 636094 (Oct. 25, 1996)
(granting no-action relief for an Internet matching service that merely connected entrepreneurs and
investors).
75. See A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 979-80; Orcutt, supranote 2, at 914-15.
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is contacting persons through preexisting relationships, which is usually
permissible, or whether the finder is actively soliciting unknown third
parties, which normally requires registration. 76 As for the extent of

solicitation that invokes broker-dealership, the staff has not provided
much guidance. 77 It is sufficient, then, to note that "[i]t is the content
and extent of the solicitation, rather than the mode of communication,
which will most likely determine the SEC's reaction to a finder's
'78
solicitation activities.
4. Prior Involvement in or Discipline for Securities Activities
Finally, the SEC has examined the extent of a finder's previous
dealings to determine whether the finder is actually a broker-dealer who
is "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities. '79 In
addition to weeding out de facto professionals, the staff has consistently
expressed a desire to prevent past securities violators from using the
finder's exception as a "back door" to remain in the industry and put
investors at risk. 80 The Rodney B. Price no-action letter demonstrates

this factor's true power. 81
In Price, no-action relief was denied even though Price's only duties

were locating broker-dealers

to serve as potential underwriters or

investors in private offerings. 82 Furthermore, Price would refrain from
selling or advising the broker-dealers, and his fee was not based on the
success of a transaction. 83 Although the requirement of registration was
not explicitly tied to Price's previous dealings in securities, one-third of
the letter was devoted to Price's prior securities activities and
84
disciplinary history.

76. See Orcutt, supranote 2, at 914-15.
77. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 979; see, e.g., Thomas R. Vorbeck, SEC No-Action Letter,
1974 WL 8305, at *2 (March 24, 1974) (requiring registration because the company's plan "would
entail some form of solicitation of business") (emphasis added).
78. A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 979-80.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2006); see also A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 980-81 (stating that
previous involvement in or discipline for securities activities increases the likelihood that a finder will
be required to register as a broker-dealer); Orcutt, supra note 2, at 916-18 (explaining that a major
factor used in determining whether a finder is a broker is the finder's involvement with and/or
discipline in prior securities related activities).
80. See A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 980; Orcutt, supranote 2, at 916.
81. See A.B.A. Report, supranote 3, at 980; Orcutt, supranote 2, at 916.
82. Rodney B. Price, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 30390, at *1-2 (Nov. 11, 1982).
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id. at *1; see also A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 980 (noting that it was "fair to conclude that the
staff's decision was motivated by the finder's previous securities activities"); Orcutt, supra note 2, at
917 (explaining that it was "logical to infer that the finder's prior activities in the securities industry
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5. A Note on Common Law

It is debatable as to whether "the factors that must be present in order
[to] receive a no-action letter are ...

identical to those that must exist

for a court to conclude that a person is a finder rather than a broker or
dealer. ' 85 Though many cases have evaluated what it means to affect
transactions in securities8 6 and a few have directly addressed the finder
versus broker-dealer distinction, 87 the finder's battle to avoid brokerdealer registration is primarily waged through SEC no-action letter
correspondence. Unfortunately, despite the increasing need for finders
in the early stages of small business development and the countervailing
risks posed by their employment, determining when a finder must
register as a broker-dealer remains an inexact science. A strict reading

of the staff's position dictates that a finder should-among other
things-remove herself from the transaction as soon as the initial

introduction is made.
III.

STATE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND THE

DAWN OF A DUAL REGULATORY SOCIETY

The SEC's failure to remedy the plight of small businesses has
prompted several states to promulgate their own finder rules. 88 These
rules are undoubtedly well-intentioned, but they will do little, if anything,
to clarify the finder versus broker-dealer distinction and facilitate small
business formation. 89 Because entrepreneurs and investors are normally
subject to state and federal regulations, state registration schemes will
only corral the rare securities offering that occurs purely intrastate. 90

and particularly his history of disciplinary actions were the primary motivation" for Price's no-action
denial).
85. See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 73, § 23.2 (explaining that "a court would not
necessarily require compliance with each and every criterion of the SEC no-action letters in
determining whether a person is a broker-dealer").
86. See, e.g., SEC v. George, 426 F.3d 786, 797 (6th Cir. 2005); SEC v. Margolin, [1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,025, at 94,517 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1992); see also Lipton, supra
note 37, at 909-12 (examining case law construing the statutory definition of a broker).
87. Several decisions illustrate that some courts may be willing to consult SEC no-action letters for
guidance. See, e.g., Couldock & Bohan v. Soci~t6 Generale Sec. Corp., 93 F. Supp. 2d 220, 228-30
(D. Conn. 2000); Cornhusker Energy Lexington, LLC v. Prospect St. Ventures, [2006 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,974, at 91,140 (D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2006).
88. See Ebaugh, supra note 7, at 21 (describing how the federal government's failure to address
financial intermediaries has caused states to "rush to regulate this area").
89. See Jacobsen & Fay, supra note 9, at 42 ("[L]ittle can effectively be done at the state level until
federal securities laws and regulations expand activities permitted by finders.").
90. See Ebaugh, supra note 7, at 22; see also ROBERT J. HAFT & MICHELE H. HUDSON, ANALYSIS OF
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Instead of solving the funding gap, state registration schemes force
finders to comply with conflicting federal and state regulations. 91 This
new problem runs counter to the general trend of securities
federalization and further highlights the need for preemptive federal
legislation articulating the permissible role of finders in the small capital
market.
A. State Registration for Finders
Michigan, Texas, and South Dakota have all recognized the need to
monitor financial intermediaries through state registration. 92 While
their mechanics are different, each state has tried to balance the goal of
investor protection with relaxed registration procedures. 93 Michigan
acted first in 1978 by defining a finder as "a person who, for
consideration, participates in the offer to sell, sale, or purchase of
securities or commodities by locating, introducing, or referring potential
purchasers or sellers. '94 These finders are exempt from the burdensome
process of broker-dealer registration, but they must still register with the
state as investment advisers. 95
Nearly twenty years later, Texas defined finders as persons who
receive compensation for introducing issuers and accredited investors for
the purpose of potential investment, but do not negotiate the terms of
96
the investment or give advice regarding the merits of the transaction.
Unlike Michigan, Texas created a distinct category of finder registration
complete with an explicit list of prohibited finder activities. 97
To
comply with the Texas statute, finders must complete an application,
pay a registration fee, make certain disclosures to prospective clients,
limit the amount of information they disseminate concerning potential

KEY SEC No-ACTION LETTERS § 9:11 (2007) (referring to the intrastate offering exception to federal
regulation as "illusory").
91. See Ebaugh, supranote 7, at 21.
92. See Posting of Jay Fishman to Jim Hamilton's World of Securities
http://jimhamiltonblog.com/2006 11 01 archive.html (Nov. 16, 2006, 10:12 EST).

Regulation,

93. See, e.g., John R. Fahy, The New Texas "Finder"Securities Broker Registration,41 TEX. J. BUS. L.

341, 341 (2006) (describing the new Texas finder rules as a "'light' version of broker-dealer
registration").
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.801(i) (2002). The Act covered finders as part of its regulatory regime
to monitor financial intermediaries who were not otherwise addressed by the registration scheme. See
Hall, supranote 10.
95. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 451.502 (2002); see also A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 966 n.7

(describing how the Michigan statute sets forth seven finder requirements for investment adviser
registration).
96. 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 115.1(a)(9) (2008).
97. Id. § 115.11(a).
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investors, and maintain detailed records available to the Texas SEC for a
five-year period. 98
South Dakota followed Texas's lead by defining a finder as a "person
who directly or indirectly locates, introduces, or refers any person to an
issuer." 99 Among other things, finders are prohibited from giving
investment advice, participating in negotiations, or soliciting new
investors. 100 Notably, South Dakota finders can receive success-based
compensation without destroying their exemption from broker-dealer
registration so long as the compensation is disclosed prior to the
transaction.101
California appears next in line as the California
Securities Commission solicited comments from the securities industry in
late 2006 to determine how the state should regulate financial
intermediaries.10 2 Texas was purposely designed as a model for other
states, and the recent surge of state activity suggests that states are tired
of waiting for the federal government to act.103 Instead of solving the
finder's dilemma, however, widespread state regulation merely increases
transaction costs for small business owners attempting to comply with
applicable law.
B. The Problems Created by a Dual Regulatory System
The dual regulatory system, which simply refers to the overlap
between federal and state securities regulation, places a particularly high
burden of compliance on small issuers with limited resources.10 4 While
both federal and state regulators aim to protect investors and promote
economic growth, competing philosophies have produced a complex set

98. Id.; see also Fahy, supra note 93, at 344-45 (listing the burdens imposed by Texas's finder
registration).
99. S.D. ADMIN. R. § 20:08:03:17(3) (2008).
100. Id. § 20:08:03:17(3), :17(5).
101. Id. § 20:08:03:17(3)-(4).
102. Ca. Dep't of Corps., Invitationfor Comments on Administrative Regulation Under the Corporate
Securities Law, Sept. 13, 2006, available at http://www.corp.ca.gov/OLP/pdf/rm/3106notice.pdf.
103. See Ebaugh, supra note 7, at 21, 23 ("When it adopted the new rules, the Texas State Securities
Board anticipated that they would be a model for other states to follow." Now, there is "[n]o question
about it, states are in a rush to regulate this area."); see also Fahy, supra note 93, at 345 ("The Texas
Finder Rule is the first such limited registration program in the United States and will act as a road map
to other State Securities Administrators and the SEC should these regulators want to do something
similar.").
104. See Douglas J. Dorsch, The National Securities Market Improvement Act: How Improved Is the
Securities Market?, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 365, 392 (1998) (explaining that "[c]ompliance costs of $100,000
are more easily swallowed by an issuer of $7,000,000 of securities than by an issuer of only
$250,000"); see also Michael W. Ott, Delaware Strikes Back: Newcastle Partners and the Fightfor
State CorporateAutonomy, 82 IND. L.J. 159, 164-65 (2007) (describing the dual regulatory system).
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of rules that many find difficult to navigate. 105 In addition to federal
requirements, issuers face varied obligations in different states, 10 6 and
even if a common legal framework controlled, jurisdictions could
interpret the framework differently.107 The end result is a patchwork
quilt of federal and multi-state regulation that-due to increased costs of
compliance-deters the formation of many small to mid-sized
businesses.108
If states continue to regulate financial intermediaries, the general
issues presented by a dual regulatory system will be imposed on an area
of the law which is already yearning for clarity. Even though Texas's
decision to register finders has received some support from the business
community, these reactions are short-sighted and misinformed.109
Instead of protecting business interests, the new registration scheme
exacerbates the funding gap by requiring small businesses to comply with
not one, but two, sets of regulations.1 10 Because the Texas statute
conflicts with the federal broker-dealer requirements and-unlike
Michigan and South Dakota-requires finders to register as a unique
category of intermediary, finders may be in compliance with one set of
rules while in violation of another. 1
For example, Texas requires the
finder's introduction be to an accredited investor, while the Exchange
Act contains no such qualification.11 2 The federal rule, on the other
hand, all but prohibits success-based compensation 3 while Texas and
105. See Renee M. Jones, Does FederalismMatter? Its PerplexingRole in the CorporateGovernance
Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 890 (2006) [hereinafter Jones, Does FederalismMatter?].
106. See Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 101, 125 (1997)
(noting that state securities laws are "a balkanized array of statutes with little resemblance to each
other" that "were extremely imposing for multistate issuers").
107. See id. at 126 (explaining that interpretation of verbatim provisions of the Uniform Securities Act
varied as much as the judges and regulators attempting to interpret them).
108. See Jones, Does Federalism Matter?, supra note 105, at 889-90 (explaining how the lack of
uniformity caused corporations to complain "that the system was duplicative and wasteful because it
required companies to contend with the costs and inconvenience of complying with federal securities
laws as well [as] the laws of every state in which their securities traded"). Apple Computer's initial
public offering is a good example of how varied state regulation can stunt capital growth. See Denos,
supra note 106, at 112. In 1980, twenty states refused to approve the offering because it was "too
risky," despite being underwritten by Morgan Stanley and achieving a very high appraisal. See id. As
we now know, the offering was very lucrative for investors.
109. For a description of how the Texas finder's rule has received local support, see Hall, supra note
10. The initial optimism of the Houston business community, however, fails to consider that only
intrastate dealings will be protected. See Ebaugh, supranote 7, at 22.
110. See Ebaugh, supra note 7, at 21, 23 ("[Flinders in Texas have the difficult task of reconciling the
new finder rules with the federal securities laws.").
111. See id. at 22-23.
112. See id. at21-22.
113. See supraPart IB. 1, supra.
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Dakota

qualifications.

114

permit

such

compensation

with

the

proper

Purely intrastate securities transactions are not subject

to federal regulations, but this narrow exception is incapable of
providing a national solution to the capital formation problems of small
115
businesses.
Not only is a state-by-state approach insensitive to the finder's
dilemma, but it also bucks the recent trend of securities federalization.
In the past decade, Congress has abandoned its reliance on a dual
regulatory system and launched a full-scale attack on the state securities
field. 116
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), 117 the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
("NSMIA"), 1 18 the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
("SLUSA"), 119 and even Sarbanes-0xley 120 are examples of federal
preemption legislation divesting regulatory power from the states in a

quest for uniformity.1 21

While states retain the authority to require

114. See S.D. ADMIN R. 20:08:03:17 (2006); Ebaugh, supra note 7, at 22.
115. See Ebaugh, supra note 7, at 22; see also Lipton, supra note 37, at 943 (stating that the intrastate
exception "is restrictively applied").
116. See A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 321
(2003) (describing the federal government's increased occupation of commercial law authority as
"the phenomenon of creeping federalization"). For a particularly scathing critique of blue sky
regulation, see J. Sinclair Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REV. 713 (1958). The former SEC
commissioner chastises blue sky laws for their "special meaning-a meaning full of complexities,
surprises, unsuspected liabilities for transactions normal and usual-in short, a crazy-quilt of state
regulations no longer significant or meaningful in purpose, and usually stultifying in effect, or just plain
useless." Id. at 714-15.
117. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The
PSLRA dramatically changed securities fraud claims by raising pleading standards and enacting lead
plaintiff provisions for securities class actions. See id; see also Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism:
Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 113 n.27 (2004)
[hereinafter Jones, Dynamic Federalism].
118. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). The NSMIA, which sought to balance investor protection with the need to streamline the
securities registration process, prohibits states from regulating or requiring the registration of federally
"covered securities," including those securities exempt from securities registration. See 15 U.S.C. §
77r(a) (2007); H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16-17 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, at 387879.
119. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(p)(c), 78(b) (2006)).
The SLUSA preempts class action suits for securities fraud based on state law when the securities at
issue are a "covered security." See Jones, Dynamic Federalism,supranote 117, at 113-14.
120. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 746 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In
response to the Enron scandal, Sarbanes-Oxley imposed a greater level of federal oversight on
corporate activity. See generally Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the SarbanesOxley Act: A Primerand a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 831-32 (2007) (describing
briefly the catalysts behind Sarbanes-Oxley).
121. See Jones, Does Federalism Matter?, supra note 105, at 894 (explaining that the preemption
legislation "overturned a seventy-year tradition of federal deference to state authority in the securities
arena"); Jones, Dynamic Federalism,supra note 117, at 113-14 (describing a series of federal attacks
on state regulatory power in the securities field); see also Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws
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notice filing and prosecute fraud within their jurisdiction, 122 the
overwhelming trend is to facilitate capital formation by removing the
burdens of multi-state compliance. 123
Applied to financial
1 24
intermediaries, federal preemption makes good economic sense.
When the role of a finder is clearly defined and registration is centrally
mandated by a common authority, regulation is powerful and
efficient. 1 25 Moreover, transaction costs decrease and more small
businesses are able to access the start-up capital currently eluding
them.126

State registration of finders has a sound theoretical basis. State
securities commissions exist to protect investors, after all, and finders
are a powerful industry of unregulated individuals who are becoming
increasingly prevalent in the early stages of capital formation.127
Despite this, the efforts of Texas and its counterparts are doomed to
fail. 128 As more and more states bow to local business interests, the body
of multi-state regulation effectively dons layer after layer. 129 While
investors may be better protected by such registration, it comes at too
high a cost. For the small businesses already disadvantaged by the
funding gap, the costs of ensuring compliance with the Exchange Act as
1 30
well as the laws of fifty states are far too great to overcome.
and the Recent CongressionalPreemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 196 (1997) (articulating the
essence of preemption as the notion that "states no longer have the authority to enact rules requiring
the registration or merit qualification of certain securities or with respect to certain transactions").
122. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2006). The preservation of state authority corresponds with the NSMIA's
stated intent to permit state governments "to regulate small, regional, or intrastate securities offerings,
and to bring actions pursuant to State laws and regulations prohibiting fraud and deceit, including
broker-dealer sales practices abuses." See H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, at 3878.
123. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt admitted, "[t]he current system of dual federal-state regulation is not the
system that Congress-or the Commission-would create today if we were designing a new system."
See S. REP. No. 104-293 at *2, available at 1996 WL 367191.
124. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 931 (proposing a federally-registered class of private placement
finders which would largely preempt state regulation); see also Letter from Michael T. Williams,
Williams Law Group, Pa., to SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies (May 30, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/265-23/mtwilliams6614.pdf (lobbying for federal
preemption).
125. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 931-32.
126. See id. (explaining that a tailored approach to finders could reduce private capital market
problems "without including a multitude of additional (and costly) regulatory requirements").
127. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
128. See Jacobsen & Fay, supranote 9, at 42.
129. See Ebaugh, supranote 7, at 21.
130. See id. at 21, 23; see also Denos, supra note 106, at 106 (explaining that issuers "not only ha[ve]
to comply with increasingly labyrinthine federal requirements, but also face[] fifty similarly worded
statutes interpreted by state courts and regulators who viewed their duty to investors from a completely
different perspective").
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Congress has recognized that a dual regulatory system stifles economic
growth in other contexts,131 but it has consistently failed to apply a
similar logic to financial intermediaries.
Along with the murky
definition of a lawful finder, a burgeoning dual regulatory system
strengthens the argument for a definitive piece of federal finder's
legislation. Without federal preemption, more states will legislate, more
burdens will be imposed, and economic growth will continue to be
13 2
hampered.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proper government reaction to the inability of small businesses
to obtain financing is to recognize the market's natural response of
employing financial intermediaries and legitimize these activities
through lightened registration.133 This encourages capital formation by
putting money into the hands of emerging small businesses and decreases
the risk of investor fraud by bringing finders within the reach of the
SEC's regulatory authority.1 3 4 The present regulatory regime, however,
does neither. Instead of embracing and defining the finder, the SEC has
13 5
declined to draw a bright line between finders and broker-dealers.
The proposal to legitimize the role of finders to facilitate capital
formation is neither new nor particularly brilliant. Commentators and
practitioners have suggested reform for years,1 36 the Small Business
Association and other advocate groups have repeatedly touted the merits
of finder's reform, 137 and the American Bar Association ("ABA") has
submitted an extensive study to the SEC identifying the crucial role
finders play, the ineffective response of the current SEC regime, and the
need for sweeping change.1 38 Most proposals rightfully hinge on the
creation of a federally-registered class of finders, either as a new
131. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
132. See Ebaugh, supranote 7, at 21, 22.
133. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 961-62; Connolly, supra note 1, at 706-07; Orcutt, supra note
2, at 938-41.
134. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 931-32.
135. See supraPart II.B.
136. See Connolly, supra note 1, at 706-07; Orcutt, supra note 2, at 928-30; Makens, supranote 21, at
5; Letter from Michael T. Williams, Williams Law Group, Pa. to SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller
Public Companies, supranote 124.
137. See SEC, Final Report of the Twenty-Third Annual SEC Government-Business Forum on Small
Business Capital Formation, at 9-10 (Sep.
20, 2004), available at http://www
sec.gov/info/smallbuslgbfor23.pdf
(denoting finder's reform as the forum's number one
recommendation).
138. See generally A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 968-70 (explaining the need for change).
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category of financial intermediary or a subset of the broker-dealer. 13 9
Finders would be required to meet minimum standards, and registration
burdens would be relaxed to create an environment where accredited
140
finders are available to the small business market.
Though finder's reform has been labeled a top priority and the SEC
has spoken with representatives from the ABA, 141 obtaining new
1 42
legislation has been and will likely continue to be an "uphill battle."
The National Association of Securities Dealers has lobbied hard to
maintain the regulatory system's current reliance on broker-dealers, and
some in the SEC fear that relaxing its registration requirements will
leave investors vulnerable to market fraud. 143 But it is getting harder
and harder to ignore market realities. The small business funding crisis
has been well-documented by the financial and legal professions, and no
one denies that small business development is essential to the growth of
the American economy. 144 In addition to generating 60% to 80% of
new jobs annually, small businesses represent 99.7% of all employer
firms, employ approximately 50% of all private sector employees, pay
more than 45% of total U.S. private payrolls, create more than 50% of
nonfarm gross domestic products, and comprise 97% of all identified
1 45

exporters.

139. Compare Orcutt, supra note 2, at 930-31 (proposing a wholly distinct class of registered
placement finders), with Connolly, supra note 1, at 724-25 (proposing a class of private investment
fund private placement broker-dealers as a subcategory of the current registered broker-dealer
community).
140. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 3, at 961-65; Connolly, supra note 1, at 725-28; Orcutt, supra note
1, at 930-45.
141. See Cohen et al., supra note 20 (reporting that the SEC Government-Business Forum on Small
Business Capital Formation made finder's reform its highest priority recommendation); Linda C.
Thomsen & John W. White, The SEC Speaks in 2008: Division of Trading and Markets Outline, 1645
PLI/Corp 91, 131 (2008) ("The [SEC] staff has met with members of the ABA Task Force, NASD
staff, and NASAA representatives to discuss the ABA Task Force's recommendations and is actively
considering the issues raised by the report.").
142. See Fink, supra note 1 (equating lobbying efforts for the SEC to lighten its registration burdens to
an "uphill battle").
143. See id. (stating that if the SEC changed course, it would "run into stiff resistance from a lobby
more influential than the CEO Council-the NASD polices broker-dealers for the SEC"). Fink also
describes how recent fraud cases have sharpened the government's stance on strict broker-dealer
requirements. See id.
144. See, e.g., Orcutt, supra note 2, at 861 ("The continuous creation of new rapid-growth start-ups
plays a substantial role in the success of the US economy."); SEC, Investor's Advocate, supra note 12
("[T]he common interest of all Americans in a growing economy that produces jobs, improves our
standard of living, and protects the value of our savings means that all of the SEC's actions must be
taken with an eye toward promoting the capital formation that is necessary to sustain economic
growth.").
145. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions, http://appl.sba.gov/faqs/faqlndexAll.cfn?
areaid=24 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008); see also Orcutt, supra note 2, at 862 (summarizing statistics
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Despite the undeniable necessity of small business formation to
overall economic growth, policymakers are content to focus on more
visible issues carrying a higher degree of political clout. Coupled with
the market squeeze on small business capital, the SEC's repeated failures
to define the lawful role of financial intermediaries in the capital-raising
process is inexcusable. Small start-up businesses are consistently denied
access to traditional capital markets, and many are left guessing as to
whether their use of a finder will incur the prosecutorial wrath of the
government. Now that states have grown impatient, the problems of a
dual regulatory system have arisen in a fresh context. The fuzzy line
between lawful finding and illegal broker-dealing, as well as the hurdles
presented by state finder's registration, prevent our best and brightest
from riding their innovations to the American dream and prolong
instead, America's nightmare. Hopefully, the recent actions of the
Texas and South Dakota legislatures will serve as a much needed wakeup
call.

provided by the Small Business Administration).

